

Paul Silva Jr.

Curriculum Vitae

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Areas of Research

- AOS **Epistemology.**
- AOC **Ethics, Metaphysics, Logic, Philosophy of Religion.**

Academic Appointments

- 2018-pres. **University of Cologne, Junior Professor (Tenure-Track).**
- 2018-pres. **CONCEPT - Cologne Center for Contemporary Epistemology and the Kantian Tradition.**
- 2017-2018 **University of Pennsylvania, Visiting Faculty.**
- 2013-2016 **Monash University, Lecturer.**

Education

- 2013 **Ph.D. Philosophy, University of Connecticut.**
- 2009 **M.A. Philosophy, University of Connecticut.**
- 2004 **B.A. Philosophy, Portland State University.**

Books

- forth **Awareness and the Substructure of Knowledge, Oxford University Press.**
- 2022 **Propositional and Doxastic Justification (Ed. Book), Routledge.** Co-editor: Luis R.G. Oliveira.
- in prep. **Epistemic Dispositions, TBD.**

Publications

- forth **Evidence, Reasons, and Knowledge in Schroeder's Reasons First, to appear in *Philosophical Studies* (w/ Sven Bernecker).**
- forth **Basic Knowledge and the Normativity of Knowledge: the Awareness-First Solution, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* (LINK).**
- forth **Possessing Reasons: Why the Awareness-First Approach is Better Than the Knowledge-First Approach, *Synthese* (LINK).**

- forth **Can Worsnip's Strategy Solve the Puzzle of Misleading Higher-Order *Apparent* Evidence?**, *Inquiry*.
- forth **Toward a Lockean Unification of Formal and Traditional Epistemology**, *Episteme* ([LINK](#)).
- 2020 **A Bayesian Explanation of the Irrationality of Sexist and Racist Beliefs Involving Generic Content**, *Synthese* ([LINK](#)).
- 2019 **Beliefless Knowing**, *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* ([LINK](#)).
- 2019 **Justified Group Belief is Evidentially Responsible Group Belief**, *Episteme* ([LINK](#)).
- 2018 **Explaining Enkratic Asymmetries: Knowledge-First Style**, *Philosophical Studies* ([LINK](#)).
- 2018 **Etiological Information and Diminishing Justification**, *Inquiry* ([LINK](#)).
- 2018 **A Conceptual Analysis of Glory**, *Res Philosophica* ([LINK](#)).
- 2017 **Knowing How to Put Knowledge First in The Theory of Justification**, *Episteme* ([LINK](#)).
- 2017 **How Doxastic Justification Helps Us Solve the Puzzle of Misleading Higher-order Evidence**, *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* ([LINK](#)).
- 2017 **The Composite Nature of Epistemic Justification**, *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* ([LINK](#)).
- 2015 **On Doxastic Justification and Properly Basing One's Beliefs**, *Erkenntnis* ([LINK](#)).
- 2015 **Does Doxastic Justification Have a Basing Requirement?**, *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* ([LINK](#)).
- 2013 **Epistemically Self-Defeating Arguments and Skepticism About Intuition**, *Philosophical Studies* ([LINK](#)).
- 2013 **How To Be Conservative: A Partial Defense of Epistemic Conservatism**, *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* ([LINK](#)).
- 2013 **Ordinary Objects and Series-Style Answers to the Special Composition Question**, *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* ([LINK](#)).

Invited Publications

- 2020 **Knowledge-First Theories of Justification**, *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy* ([LINK](#)).
- forth **Propositional Justification and Doxastic Justification (w/Luis Oliveira)**, *The Routledge Companion to Evidence*, eds. M. Lasonen-Aarnio & C. Littlejohn, *Routledge* ([LINK](#)).

- forth **Response to Oliveira on Doxastic Justification and the Basing Requirement**, *Propositional and Doxastic Justification*, eds. P. Silva & L.R.G. Oliveira, *Routledge* (LINK).
- forth **Knowledge-First Evidentialism and the Dilemmas of Self-Impact**, *Epistemic Dilemmas*, eds. *Kevin McCain, Scott Stapleford & Matthias Steup* (LINK).
- 2020 **Debunking Objective Consequentialism: The Challenge of Knowledge-Centric Anti-Luck Epistemology**, *Higher Order Evidence and Moral Epistemology*, Routledge (LINK).
- 2016 **Why Worry About Epistemic Circularity?**, *Journal of Philosophical Research*, Papers in Honor of William Alston (w/ M.P. Lynch) (LINK).

Presentations

- 2022 **University of Oxford, Oriel College**, *Belief-Suspension Compatibilism*.
- 2022 **German Society for Analytic Philosophy**, *Belief-Suspension Compatibilism*.
- 2022 **Swarthmore College**, *TBD*.
- 2022 **Goethe University (Frankfurt am Main)**, *The Normativity of Statistical Evidence*.
- 2022 **UNC Chapel Hill, Normativity Workshop**, *The Normativity of Statistical Evidence*.
- 2022 **American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division**, *Comments on Mark Schroeder's Reasons First*.
- 2022 **American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division**, *Comments on Eric García's "Belief Content and Rationality: Why Racist Beliefs Are Not Rational"*.
- 2021 **University of Edinburgh (TBD due to pandemic)**, *Contemporary Kantian Epistemology*.
- 2021 **American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division**, *An Epistemic Paradox: Awareness ≠ Knowledge*.
- 2021 **University of Glasgow**, *A Lite Epistemic Paradox*.
- 2021 **Ruhr University Bochum**, *Awareness and the Substructure of Knowledge*.
- 2020 **University of Warwick**, *When Merely Statistical Evidence Justifies Belief*.
- 2020 **University of Zürich**, *On Knowledge and Belief*.

- 2020 **Technische Universität Dortmund**, *When Merely Statistical Evidence Justifies Belief*.
- 2019 **Return of the Kantians Conference, University of Cologne**, *Kantian Modal Epistemology*.
- 2019 **Goethe University (Frankfurt am Main)**, *Awareness-First Virtue Epistemology*.
- *2019 **University of St. Andrews (invitation declined for family reasons)**, *Awareness for Groups*.
- 2019 **American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division**, *Beliefless Knowing*.
- 2018 **Swarthmore College**, *Belief, Credence, Mistuned Knowledge*.
- 2018 **The Society for Exact Philosophy**, *A Bayesian Explanation of the Irrationality of Sexist and Racist Beliefs Involving Generic Content*.
- 2017 **Washington University of Saint Louis**, *A Bayesian Explanation of the Irrationality of Sexist and Racist Beliefs Involving Generic Content*.
- 2017 **University of Cologne**, *A Bayesian Explanation of the Irrationality of Sexist and Racist Beliefs Involving Generic Content*.
- 2017 **University of Delaware**, *A Bayesian Explanation of the Irrationality of Sexist and Racist Beliefs Involving Generic Content*.
- 2017 **University of Connecticut, Social Epistemology Workshop**, *A Bayesian Explanation of the Irrationality of Sexist and Racist Beliefs Involving Generic Content*.
- 2017 **Syracuse University, The Creighton Club: The New York State Philosophical Association**, *Justified Group Belief is Evidentially Responsible Group Belief*.
- 2017 **College of William and Mary**, *A Conceptual Analysis of Glory*.
- 2017 **Swarthmore College**, *Beliefless Knowing*.
- 2017 **St. Joseph's University**, *Beliefless Knowing*.
- 2017 **University of Notre Dame, Formal Epistemology Reading Group**, *Mistuned Knowledge (w/ Matt Lee)*.
- 2016 **La Trobe University**, *Problems for Evidential Enkrasia are No Problem for Normative Enkrasia*.
- 2016 **Monash University, Australasian Association of Philosophy**, *Some Problems Relating Oughts to Evidence*.
- 2015 **University of Oxford, Etiology of Belief Workshop**, *Etiology and Defeat*.

- 2015 **Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics, Charles Stuart University**, *How to Endorse an Evidence Requirement, a Coherence Requirement, and the Possibility of Misleading Higher-Order Evidence.*
- 2015 **Macquarie University, Australasian Association of Philosophy**, *Epistemically Self-Defeating Arguments and A Virtue of Virtue Epistemology.*
- 2014 **University of Melbourne**, *On Doxastic Justification's Supposed Basing Requirement.*
- 2014 **University of Canterbury**, *Etiology and Defeat.*
- 2014 **American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division**, *Justification and Composite Normative Concepts.*
- 2014 **The Australian National University, Australasian Association of Philosophy**, *Justification and Composite Normative Concepts.*
- 2013 **University of Auckland**, *On Propositional and Doxastic Justification.*
- 2013 **University of Edinburgh**, *On the Nature and Grounds of Justification.*
- 2012 **American Philosophical Association, Central Division**, *The Special Composition Question, Transitivity, and Ordinary Objects.*
- 2012 **University of Connecticut Humanities Institute**, *Conservatism, Dogmatism, and Liberalism in Epistemology.*
- 2011 **St. Louis University**, *Yet More Transmission Failure.*
- 2011 **University of Notre Dame**, *Epistemic Inconsistency and Skepticism About Intuition.*

Teaching Experience

- 2021 **Non-Traditional Epistemology**, University of Cologne.
- 2020 **Knowledge, Law, and Statistical Evidence**, University of Cologne.
- 2019 **The Epistemology of Sexism and Racism**, University of Cologne.
- 2018 **Kant and Contemporary Epistemology**, University of Cologne.
- 2018-2021 **Metaphysics and Epistemology**, University of Cologne.
- 2014-2016 **Life, Death, and Morality**, Monash University, 1st year course, taught on-line and on-campus.
- 2013-2016 **Time, Self, and Mind**, Monash University, 1st year course, taught on-line and on-campus.
- 2014-2015 **Ethics (Normative Ethics and Metaethics)**, Monash University, 2nd/3rd year course, taught on-line and on-campus.

- 2014 **Knowledge and Justification**, Monash University, 4th year honors seminar in epistemology.
- 2013 **Skepticism, Perception, Intuition**, Monash University, 4th year honors seminar in epistemology.
- 2009-2012 **Ethics and Social Philosophy**, University of Connecticut, 1st year course.
- 2012 **Introduction to Philosophy**, University of Connecticut, 1st year course.
- 2007-2009 **Teaching Assistant: Ethics and Social Philosophy, and Introduction to Philosophy**, University of Connecticut.

Service to the Discipline

Referee for **Nous, Mind, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Erkenntnis, Philosophical Studies, American Philosophical Quarterly, Philosophical Psychology, Synthese.**