

Paul Silva Jr.

Curriculum Vitae

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Areas of Research

- AOS **Epistemology** (including social epistemology and formal epistemology).
- AOC **Ethics, Metaphysics, Logic, Philosophy of Religion, History of Modern Philosophy.**

Academic Appointments

- 2018-pres. **University of Cologne, Junior Professor.**
- 2018-pres. **CONCEPT - Cologne Center for Contemporary Epistemology and the Kantian Tradition.**
- 2017-2018 **University of Pennsylvania, Visiting Faculty.**
- 2013-2016 **Monash University, Lecturer.**

Education

- 2013 **Ph.D. Philosophy, University of Connecticut.**
- 2009 **M.A. Philosophy, University of Connecticut.**
- 2004 **B.A. Philosophy, Portland State University.**

Publications

- forth **Basic Knowledge and the Normativity of Knowledge: the Awareness-First Solution, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* (LINK).**
- forth **Possessing Reasons: Why the Awareness-First Approach is Better Than the Knowledge-First Approach, *Synthese* (LINK).**
- forth **Knowledge-First Theories of Justification, *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (LINK).**
- forth **Can Worsnip's Strategy Solve the Puzzle of Misleading Higher-Order *Apparent* Evidence?, *Inquiry* (LINK).**
- forth **Toward a Lockean Unification of Formal and Traditional Epistemology, *Episteme* (LINK).**

- forth **Propositional Justification and Doxastic Justification** (w/Luis Oliveira), *The Routledge Companion to Evidence*, eds. M. Lasonen-Aarnio & C. Littlejohn, *Routledge* ([LINK](#)).
- forth **Response to Oliveira on Doxastic Justification and the Basing Requirement**, *Propositional and Doxastic Justification*, eds. P. Silva & L.R.G. Oliveira, *Routledge* ([LINK](#)).
- 2020 **Debunking Objective Consequentialism: The Challenge of Knowledge-Centric Anti-Luck Epistemology**, *Higher Order Evidence and Moral Epistemology*, Routledge ([LINK](#)).
- 2020 **A Bayesian Explanation of the Irrationality of Sexist and Racist Beliefs Involving Generic Content**, *Synthese* ([LINK](#)).
- 2019 **Beliefless Knowing**, *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* ([LINK](#)).
- 2019 **Justified Group Belief is Evidentially Responsible Group Belief**, *Episteme* ([LINK](#)).
- 2018 **Explaining Enkratic Asymmetries: Knowledge-First Style**, *Philosophical Studies* ([LINK](#)).
- 2018 **Etiological Information and Diminishing Justification**, *Inquiry* ([LINK](#)).
- 2018 **A Conceptual Analysis of Glory**, *Res Philosophica* ([LINK](#)).
- 2017 **How Doxastic Justification Helps Us Solve the Puzzle of Misleading Higher-order Evidence**, *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* ([LINK](#)).
- 2017 **The Composite Nature of Epistemic Justification**, *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* ([LINK](#)).
- 2017 **Knowing How to Put Knowledge First in The Theory of Justification**, *Episteme* ([LINK](#)).
- 2016 **Why Worry About Epistemic Circularity?**, *Journal of Philosophical Research*, (w/ M.P. Lynch) ([LINK](#)).
- 2015 **On Doxastic Justification and Properly Basing One's Beliefs**, *Erkenntnis* ([LINK](#)).
- 2015 **Does Doxastic Justification Have a Basing Requirement?**, *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* ([LINK](#)) .
- 2013 **Epistemically Self-Defeating Arguments and Skepticism About Intuition**, *Philosophical Studies* ([LINK](#)).
- 2013 **How To Be Conservative: A Partial Defense of Epistemic Conservatism [in the epistemology of perception]**, *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* ([LINK](#)).
- 2013 **Ordinary Objects and Series-Style Answers to the Special Composition Question**, *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* ([LINK](#)).

Work In Progress

- forth **Propositional and Doxastic Justification (edited volume)**, *Under Contract With Routledge*. Co-editor: Luis R.G. Oliveira. **Committed Contributors:** Ralph Wedgwood, Ram Neta, Duncan Pritchard, Lisa Miracchi, Annalisa Coliva, Mona Simion, Robert Audi, Anne Meylan, Errol Lord, Hilary Kornblith, Jonathan Kvanvig, Rima Basu, Elizabeth Jackson, Clayton Littlejohn.
- MS **How Normic Support Solves Puzzles of Statistical Evidence for Belief and Legal Standards of Proof**, under review.
- MS **Preservationism and Platonism in the Epistemology of Memory (w/ Sven Bernecker)**, in preparation.
- MS **Perceptual Knowledge that P in Virtue of Perceiving that P**, in preparation.
- MS **What Can Proprioception Teach Us About The Epistemology of Perception?**, in preparation.
- MS **Understanding Hume's Skepticism**, in preparation.
- MS **In Defense of the Kantian Theory of Knowledge**, in preparation.
- MS **A Function-First Solution to Dilemmas of Self-Relevance (w/ Eyal Tal)**, in preparation.

Presentations

- 2020 **University of Edinburgh (TBD due to pandemic)**, *Contemporary Kantian Epistemology*.
- 2020 **University of Warwick (TBD due to pandemic)**, *On Knowledge and Belief*.
- 2020 **Technische Universität Dortmund (TBD due to pandemic)**, *On Possessing Reasons*.
- 2019 **Return of the Kantians Conference, University of Cologne**, *Kantian Modal Epistemology*.
- 2019 **Goethe University (Frankfurt am Main)**, *Awareness-First Virtue Epistemology*.
- *2019 **University of St. Andrews (invitation declined for family reasons)**, *Awareness for Groups*.
- 2019 **American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division**, *Beliefless Knowing*.
- 2018 **Swarthmore College**, *Belief, Credence, Mistuned Knowledge*.
- 2018 **The Society for Exact Philosophy**, *A Bayesian Explanation of the Irrationality of Sexist and Racist Beliefs Involving Generic Content*.

- 2017 **Washington University of Saint Louis**, *A Bayesian Explanation of the Irrationality of Sexist and Racist Beliefs Involving Generic Content.*
- 2017 **University of Cologne**, *A Bayesian Explanation of the Irrationality of Sexist and Racist Beliefs Involving Generic Content.*
- 2017 **University of Delaware**, *A Bayesian Explanation of the Irrationality of Sexist and Racist Beliefs Involving Generic Content.*
- 2017 **University of Connecticut, Social Epistemology Workshop**, *A Bayesian Explanation of the Irrationality of Sexist and Racist Beliefs Involving Generic Content.*
- 2017 **Syracuse University, The Creighton Club: The New York State Philosophical Association**, *Justified Group Belief is Evidentially Responsible Group Belief .*
- 2017 **College of William and Mary**, *A Conceptual Analysis of Glory.*
- 2017 **Swarthmore College**, *Beliefless Knowing.*
- 2017 **St. Joseph's University**, *Beliefless Knowing.*
- 2017 **University of Notre Dame, Formal Epistemology Reading Group**, *Mistuned Knowledge (w/ Matt Lee).*
- 2016 **La Trobe University**, *Problems for Evidential Enkrasia are No Problem for Normative Enkrasia.*
- 2016 **Monash University, Australasian Association of Philosophy**, *Some Problems Relating Oughts to Evidence.*
- 2015 **University of Oxford, Etiology of Belief Workshop**, *Etiology and Defeat.*
- 2015 **Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics, Charles Stuart University**, *How to Endorse an Evidence Requirement, a Coherence Requirement, and the Possibility of Misleading Higher-Order Evidence.*
- 2015 **Macquarie University, Australasian Association of Philosophy**, *Epistemically Self-Defeating Arguments and A Virtue of Virtue Epistemology.*
- 2014 **University of Melbourne**, *On Doxastic Justification's Supposed Basing Requirement.*
- 2014 **University of Canterbury**, *Etiology and Defeat.*
- 2014 **American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division**, *Justification and Composite Normative Concepts.*
- 2014 **The Australian National University, Australasian Association of Philosophy**, *Justification and Composite Normative Concepts.*
- 2013 **University of Auckland**, *On Propositional and Doxastic Justification.*

- 2013 **University of Edinburgh**, *On the Nature and Grounds of Justification*.
- 2012 **American Philosophical Association, Central Division**, *The Special Composition Question, Transitivity, and Ordinary Objects*.
- 2012 **University of Connecticut Humanities Institute**, *Conservatism, Dogmatism, and Liberalism in Epistemology*.
- 2011 **St. Louis University**, *Yet More Transmission Failure*.
- 2011 **University of Notre Dame**, *Epistemic Inconsistency and Skepticism About Intuition*.

Service to the Discipline

Referee for **Nous, Mind, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Erkenntnis, Philosophical Studies, American Philosophical Quarterly, Philosophical Psychology, Synthese**.

References

Prof. Sven Bernecker, Universität zu Köln/ UC Irvine. Contact: s.bernecker@uni-koeln.de.

Prof. Thomas Grundmann, Universität zu Köln. Contact: thomas.grundmann@uni-koeln.de.

Prof. Michael Lynch, University of Connecticut. Contact: mplynch@uconn.edu.

Prof. Joshua Schechter, Brown University. Contact: Joshua_Schechter@brown.edu.

Prof. Joel Pust, University of Delaware. Contact: jpust@udel.edu.